SHOOKAT vs CA

GR 97336 February 19, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner is an Iranian citizen  who promised to marry 22 year old Filipina. They therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester. The petitioner forced her to live with him, a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs

Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married.

Petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent nor forced her to live in his apartment. He did not maltreated her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. As a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling.

ISSUE: whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry?

whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar?

HELD:

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy