Dreamwork Construction VS. Janiola

G.R. No. 184861

June 30, 2009

FACTS:

This case involves a violation of Batas Pambansa bilang 22, whereby the petitioners filed ciriminal information against the Private respondent.

Subsequently, herein respondent filed a complaint against Dreamwork Construction for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The check which was subject of the criminal case were used as a consideration for the construction agreement.

Respondent filed a motion to suspend the hearing on the grounds of Prejudicial Question.

Petitioner opposed the suspension by alleging that:

(1)       there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

MTC granted the motion; Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.

HELD:

Petition must be granted.

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

In the instant case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution. We find for petitioner.

Casupanan vs Laroya

G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002

FACTS:

The parties in this case were involved in a vehicular accident. As a result, Casupanan filed a civil case against Laroya for Quasi-delict and Laroya filed a criminal case against the former for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was already in its Preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum shopping considering the own going criminal case, which was granted.

Casupanan filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently from the criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or nor an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case?

HELD:

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

People vs Aragon

February 28, 1957

G.R. No. L-10016

FACTS:

Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu while he is still married to Maria Gorrea. Yet again, the accused now under the name of Proceso Aragon contracted another a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol.

This was put into possibility because the accused was then a traveling sales man. When Maria Gorrea died, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, Aragon brought Faicol to Cebu from Iloilo, where she became a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol however, suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment brought to her by Aragon. Due to the injuries she was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment, in her absence the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.

He then categorically denied in the court his marriage to Maria Faicol but affirmed his marriage to Maglasang.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

ISSUE:

Whethe or not accused is guilty of bigamy?

HELD:

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Hambon vs CA

G.R. No. 122150

March 17, 2003

FACTS:

Herein respondent filed a complaint for damages against respondent for the injuries and expenses he sustained when the latter’s truck bumped him that night of December 9, 1985.

However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed previously against the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioner’s lack of interest.

Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.

Trial Court rendered decision in favor of petitioner,

Court of Appeals reversed the decision, on the grounds that the Hambon failed to file the civil case. Hence, it is impliedly instituted with the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the dismissal of the civil case.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE

HELD:

1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case....  In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal action.

Contrary to private respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure.  The requirement is merely procedural in nature.  For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.

x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.

. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":

‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed.  With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.chan robles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto