GSIS vs. Court of Appeals and R. Balais

G.R. No. 117572, January 29, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Rosa Balais an employee of National Housing Authority suffered from Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm, because of this she can no longer perform efficiently. For this reason, she retired and filed for disability benefits. GSIS granted her application for temporary total disability and later was changed to permanent partial disability. She again filed with GSIS an application for permanent total disability, which GSIS denied on the ground that her condition does not qualify for permanent total disability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Rosa Balais is entitled of her permanent total disability?

HELD:

“A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause” (GSIS vs. CA. G.R. No. 116015, July 31, 1996)

In the case at bar, the denial of the claim for permanent total disability benefit of private respondent who, for 38 long years during her prime had rendered her best service with an unblemished record and who was compelled to retire on account of her worsening conditioning would indeed subvert the salutary intentions of the law in favor of the worker. The court, therefore, affirms the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals decreeing conversion of private respondent’s disability from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. 

Tabas et al VS. California Manufacturing Company

G.R. No. L-80680 January 26, 1989

Facts:

Petitioners filed a petition in the NLRC for reinstatement and payment of various benefits against California Manufacturing Company. The respondent company then denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the company and the petitioners.

Pursuant to a manpower supply agreement, it appears that the petitioners prior their involvement with California Manufacturing Company were employees of Livi Manpower service, an independent contractor, which assigned them to work as "promotional merchandisers." The agreement provides that:

California "has no control or supervisions whatsoever over [Livi's] workers with respect to how they accomplish their work or perform [Californias] obligation" It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be on a "seasonal and contractual basis"; that "[c]ost of living allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be charged directly to [California] at cost "; and that "[p]ayroll for the preceeding [sic] week [shall] be delivered by [Livi] at [California's] premises."

Issue:

Whether the petitioners are California's or Livi's employees?

Held:

There is no doubt that in the case at bar, Livi performs "manpower services",  meaning to say, it contracts out labor in favor of clients. We hold that it is one notwithstanding its vehement claims to the contrary, and notwithstanding the provision of the contract that it is "an independent contractor."  The nature of one's business is not determined by self-serving appellations one attaches thereto but by the tests provided by statute and prevailing case law.  The bare fact that Livi maintains a separate line of business does not extinguish the equal fact that it has provided California with workers to pursue the latter's own business. In this connection, we do not agree that the petitioners had been made to perform activities 'which are not directly related to the general business of manufacturing,"  California's purported "principal operation activity. "  The petitioner's had been charged with "merchandizing [sic] promotion or sale of the products of [California] in the different sales outlets in Metro Manila including task and occational [sic] price tagging,"  an activity that is doubtless, an integral part of the manufacturing business. It is not, then, as if Livi had served as its (California's) promotions or sales arm or agent, or otherwise, rendered a piece of work it (California) could not have itself done; Livi, as a placement agency, had simply supplied it with the manpower necessary to carry out its (California's) merchandising activities, using its (California's) premises and equipment.

Neither Livi nor California can therefore escape liability, that is, assuming one exists.

Petition granted.

Salazar vs. Achacoso and Marquez

G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990

FACTS:

A complaint against the petitioner Salazar was filed for withholding the complainant’s PECC Card, it was further alleged that Salazar did not posses a license to operate as a recruitment agency. POEA through its Director on Licensing and Regulation, issued a warrant of arrest and seizure against the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure is valid?

HELD:

            Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest." Mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.

Pan American World Airways System Vs. Pan American Employees Association

G.R. No. L-16275 February 23, 1961

Facts:

The employees of Pan American World Airways System alleges that the company does not provide them of a one-hour break period. The employees were asked to wait in case of any emergencies while having their break or they will be reprimanded, thus the petition of the employees to ask the court for a proper compensation from the employers. The employees allege that the said one-hour break actually constitutes working over time.

Issue:

Whether or not the time given to the employees for break is considered an over time?

Held:

The Industrial Court's order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal period was but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest, but was actually a work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call. Of course, if the Company practices in this regard should be modified to afford the mechanics a real rest during that hour (f. ex., by installing an entirely different emergency crew, or any similar arrangement), then the modification of this part of the decision may be sought from the Court below. As things now stand, we see no warrant for altering the decision.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.

Obango VS NLRC and Antique Electric Cooperative Inc.

G.R. No. L-147420 June 10, 2004

Facts:

Petitioners argue that monthly-paid employees are considered paid for all days of the month including un-worked days. Petitioners assert that they should be paid for all the 365 days in a year. They argue that since in the computation of leave credits, ANTECO uses a divisor of 304, ANTECO is not paying them 61 days every year. Petitioners base their claim on Section 2, Rule IV of Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

On 29 November 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners granting them wage differentials amounting to P1,017,507.73 and attorney’s fees of 10%. ANTECO appealed the Decision to the NLRC on 24 December 1996. On 27 November 1997, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to their money claim?

Held:

Petitioners’ claim is without basis

Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Policy Instructions No. 9 issued by the Secretary (then Minister) of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code’s provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion.

The Labor Code is clear that monthly-paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly-paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules, Section 2 which provides that monthly-paid employees are presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.

Thus, Section 2 cannot serve as basis of any right or claim. Absent any other legal basis, petitioners’ claim for wage differentials must fail.

The basic rule in this jurisdiction is "no work, no pay." The right to be paid for un-worked days is generally limited to the ten legal holidays in a year.

GSIS vs. Court of Appeals and R. Balais

G.R. No. 117572, January 29, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Rosa Balais an employee of National Housing Authority suffered from Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm, because of this she can no longer perform efficiently. For this reason, she retired and filed for disability benefits. GSIS granted her application for temporary total disability and later was changed to permanent partial disability. She again filed with GSIS an application for permanent total disability, which GSIS denied on the ground that her condition does not qualify for permanent total disability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Rosa Balais is entitled of her permanent total disability?

HELD:

“A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause” (GSIS vs. CA. G.R. No. 116015, July 31, 1996)

In the case at bar, the denial of the claim for permanent total disability benefit of private respondent who, for 38 long years during her prime had rendered her best service with an unblemished record and who was compelled to retire on account of her worsening conditioning would indeed subvert the salutary intentions of the law in favor of the worker. The court, therefore, affirms the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals decreeing conversion of private respondent’s disability from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. 

General Milling Corporation vs. Torres

G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991

FACTS:

Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant and assistant coach.  He possessed an alien employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged employee by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. GMC requested that Cone’s employment permit be changed to a full-fledged coach, which was contested by The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines. Alleging that GMC failed to show that there is no competent person in the Philippines to do the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment permit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit?

HELD:

The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit. GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has no legal basis. Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of labor. GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit.

            The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the services of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the application to perform the services for which an alien is desired.”

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, FREDERICK WHITE and JESUS SANTIAGO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FFW-GLOBE MACKAY EMPLOYEES UNION and EDA CONCEPCION

G.R. No. 74156 June 29, 1988

Facts:

On October 30, 1984 Wage Order No. 6 mandated an increased in the cost-of-living allowance of non-agricultural workers in the private sector for P3.00. The order was complied by the petitioner Corporation by multiplying the same by 22 days, equivalent to the number of working days in the company.

Respondent union alleges that instead of multiplying the COLA by 22 it should be multiplied by 30 representing the number of days in a month, as what the corporation's normal practice prior to the said Wage Order. Thus the union filed a complaint against the Corporation for for illegal deduction, underpayment, unpaid allowances, and violation of Wage Order No. 6.

Issue:

Whether or not COLA under Wage Order No. 6 should be multiplied by 22 or 30 representing the number of working days in a month.

Held:

Labor Arbiter Adelaido F. Martinez sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding that since the individual petitioners acted in their corporate capacity they should not have been impleaded; and that the monthly COLA should be computed on the basis of twenty two (22) days, since the evidence showed that there are only 22 paid days in a month for monthly-paid employees in the company. His reasoning, inter alia, was as follows:

To compel the respondent company to use 30 days in a month to compute the allowance and retain 22 days for vacation and sick leave, overtime pay and other benefits is inconsistent and palpably unjust. If 30 days is used as divisor, then it must be used for the computation of all benefits, not just the allowance. But this is not fair to complainants, not to mention that it will contravene the provision of the parties' CBA.

Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 uniformly read as follows:

Section 5. Allowance for Unworked Days.

All covered employees shall be entitled to their daily living allowance during the days that they are paid their basic wage, even if unworked. (Emphasis supplied)

... it is evident that the intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. Hence, we have the principle of 'No Pay, No ECOLA.

Darvin vs. CA and People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 125044, July 13, 1998

FACTS:

Maria Toledo convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to recruit workers for abroad and that she can facilitate the necessary papers, gave Darvin Php150,000 for airfare and US visa. However, she was not given a work permit to validly work in the US.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of illegal recruitment?

Held:

            There is lack of evidence that accused offered Toledo a job. Procuring of an airfare ticket and a US visa does not qualify illegal recruitment.

CITIZENS' LEAGUE OF FREEWORKERS AND/OR BALBINO EPIS, NICOLAS ROJO, ET AL. vs. HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao and TEOFILO GERONIMO and EMERITA MENDEZ

G.R. No. L-21212             September 23, 1966

Facts:

On March 11, 1963 the respondents filed a complaint to restrain the Citizens' League of Freeworkers, a legitimate labor organization (referred to as union) from interfering in with  the respondents’ auto-calesas business in Davao and to recover damages from  committing certain acts complained of in connection therewith. The union members who were drivers of the said business, alleges that the defendants named therein used to lease the auto-calesas of the spouses on a daily rental basis and that the same does not recognize the union as their employees rather the petitioners were treated as lessees and refuses to bargain with them. The union declared a strike on February 20, 1963, to which paralyzed plaintiffs' business operations through threats, intimidation and violence. The writ was granted.

On March 18, 1963, petitioners filed a motion to declare the writ of preliminary injunction void on the ground that the same had expired by virtue of Section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875. In his order of March 21, 1963, however, the respondent judge denied said motion on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship between respondents-spouses and the individual petitioners herein and that, consequently, the Rules of Court and not Republic Act No. 875 applied to the matter of injunction. Thereupon the petition under consideration was filed.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship existing from a daily rental basis company?

Held:

In the case of Isabelo Doce vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. (G.R. No. L-9417, December 22, 1958), upon a similar if not an altogether identical set of facts, We held:

"The only features that would make the relationship of lessor and lessee between the respondent, owner of the jeeps, and the drivers, members of the petitioner union, are the fact that he does not pay them any fixed wage but their compensation is the excess of the total amount of fares earned or collected by them over and above the amount of P7.50 which they agreed to pay to the respondent, and the fact that the gasoline burned by the jeeps is for the account of the drivers. These two features are not, however, sufficient to withdraw the relationship, between them from that of employer-employee, because the estimated earnings for fares must be over and above the amount they agreed to pay to the respondent for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps. Not having any interest in the business because they did not invest anything in the acquisition of the jeeps and did not participate in the management thereof, their service as drivers of the jeeps being their only contribution to the business, the relationship of lessor and lessee cannot be sustained."

          Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent judge in Civil Case No. 3966 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, with costs.