PLDT vs CA

G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989

Facts:

A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open trench, the excavation was due to the installation of an underground conduit system by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover and any warning signs.

As a result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and their vehicle was also damaged.

PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents own negligence. Also, it alleges that L.R. Barte and company acting as an independent contractor, should be responsible for the excavation was performed by them.

As for Barte, they alleged that they have complied with the due standards in performing their work, and that it was not aware of the accident involving the Estebans.

Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.

Upon respondent’s second motion to reconsideration, CA reversed its decision, following he decision of Trial Court and held PLDT liable for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not PLDT is liable

Held:

NO

We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

RCPI VS. CA

G.R. No. 79578 March 13, 1991

Facts:

Spouses Timan through RCPI sent a telegram, in order to express their condolences for the death of the mother-in-law of their cousins Mr. and Mrs. Midoranda. The telegram, however, was written in a “Happy Birthday” card and inserted in a “Christmasgram” envelope.

The spouses Timan, filed an action against RCPI in order to claim damages for the ridicule, contempt and humiliation that the latter caused to the private respondents.

RCPI in its defense alleges that the "error" in the social form used does not come within the ambit of fraud, malice or bad faith as understood/defined under the law.

Court rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Timan.

Issue:

Whether or not RCPI should be held liable

HELD:

YES

We fully agree with the appellate court's endorsement of the trial court's conclusion that RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its services to the public, is engaged in a business affected with public interest. As such, it is bound to exercise that degree of diligence expected of it in the performance of its obligation.

In the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and meant to convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. Precisely, it is denominated "telegram of condolence" because it tenders sympathy and offers to share another's grief. It seems out of this world, therefore, to place that message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same in a Christmas envelope for such acts of carelessness and incompetence not only render violence to good taste and common sense, they depict a bizarre presentation of the sender's feelings. They ridicule the deceased's loved ones and destroy the atmosphere of grief and respect for the departed.

EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad-Litem of minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and EDERIC, all surnamed BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON and PATRIA BONE-JOCSON, Spouses JOSE RAMOS and ENRIQUETA CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA and MA. COMMEMORACION PEREA-BUSTAMANTE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND EDILBERTO MONTESIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991

FACTS:

A collision between a gravel and sand truck, driven by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus, driven by Susulin, took place in Tanza, Cavite. Due to the impact several passengers of the bus were injured some died.

The driver of the bus noticed that the wheels of the said truck was wiggling and that the latter was occupying his lane. In thinking that the driver of the truck was only joking, he accelerated and tried to overtake a hand tractor, the collision took place.

Trial Court rendered the decision that both drivers shall be soidarily liable.

CA, reversed and set a side the judgment in favor of Del Pilar and Montesiano, opined that "the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance can be applied in the present case.

HELD:

The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court citing the landmark decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."

JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, Respondents.

G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999

FACTS:

When respondent Criselda was signing her credit card slip at payment and verification counter in Syvels Department Store in Makati, she felt a sudden gust of wind a heard a loud sound. She looked behind her and saw her daughter Zhieneth (6 years old) on the floor pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter.

She was rushed to the hospital but died after 14 days.

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages.

Petitioners on the other hand, denied any liability imputing the negligence to Criselda for allowing her daughter to roam freely in the department store. Alleging further, that the deceased committed contributory negligence when she climbed the counter. Also herein petitioners defense is that they have exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of their employees.

Trial Court favored petitioners, contemplating that Zhieneth’s action is the proximate cause of the accident.

CA favored respondents on it declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7) years old at the time of the incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child under nine (9) years could not be held liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could not be made to account for a mere mischief or reckless act. It also absolved CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the ordinary in momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the document at the nearby counter.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence.

(2) Whether or not the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence.

HELD:

(1)NO

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence

In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.

(2)NEGLIGENCE.

An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant

negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only be attributed to negligence.

Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

CHINA AIR LINES, LTD., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PAGSIBIGAN, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. and ROBERTO ESPIRITU, respondents.

G.R. No. 45985 May 18, 1990

FACTS:

Jose Pagsibagan, General Manager of Rentokil (Phil.) Inc. purchased an airline ticket for Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila with Philippine Airlines which at that time was a sales and ticketing agent of China Air Lines.

His plane ticket indicated that he is booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812 to depart from Manila for Taipei on June 10, 1968 at 17:20 hours (5:20 p.m.) as issued by PAL, through its ticketing clerk defendant Roberto Espiritu.

One hour before his flight, Pagsibagan was informed that Flight No. 812 bound to Taipei had already left at 10:20. PAL employees made appropriate arrangements for the former to take the next flight to Taipei the following day, to which he arrived around noontime.

Jose Pagsibagan filed a complaint for damages, alleging further the negligence of Roberto Espiritu.

PAL on its defense alleges that its ticketing office through Roberto Espiritu asked for confirmation from CAL before issuing the ticket to Mr. Pagsibagan, which CAL confirmed.

Defendant China Air Lines, for its part, disclaims liability for the negligence and incompetence of the employees of PAL. Moreover, CAL avers that it had properly notified PAL of the flight schedule.

Trial Court ruled that PAL and its employee shall indemnify Pagsibagan. However, the complaint is dismissed with respect to CAL.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CAL shall be rendered liable.

HELD:

NO.

There is indeed no basis whatsoever to hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. As hereinbefore stated, the court a quo absolved CAL of any liability for fault or negligence. This finding was shared by respondent court when it concluded that defendant CAL did not contribute to the negligence committed by therein defendants-appellants PAL and Roberto Espiritu.

Respondent Pagsibigan insists that CAL was barred from proving that it observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. This argument is obviously misplaced. CAL is not the employer of PAL or Espiritu. In Duavit vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., ¹¹ we have stressed the need of first establishing the existence of an employer-employee relationship before an employer may be vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

SHOOKAT vs CA

GR 97336 February 19, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner is an Iranian citizen  who promised to marry 22 year old Filipina. They therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester. The petitioner forced her to live with him, a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs

Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married.

Petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent nor forced her to live in his apartment. He did not maltreated her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. As a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling.

ISSUE: whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry?

whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar?

HELD:

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy 

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987

FACTS:

Respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving on his way home from a cocktail-and-dinner party, from which he had a “shot or two” of liquor.  He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati when allegedly his car headlights suddenly failed.

He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming traffic. It also did not have any lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices.

Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. Due to the event therefore the herein private respondent filed an action for Damages on the grounds that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Phoenix had allowed its truck to be parked.

Petitioners’ defense: that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.

Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel.

Intermediate Appellate Court confirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Phoenix’s negligence is the proximate cause?

HELD:

YES.

We agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.

We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.

NAPOCOR vs CA

GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate complaints., filed against NPC and a particular Chavez.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and destruction of properties due to the negligence of the latter in releasing water from Angat dam during the typhoon “Kading”

Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam.

NPC’s allegations were as follows:

1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant;

2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions;

4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property;

5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted and;

6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.

The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of its charter allowing it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions based on tort. Its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible evidence."

Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the private respondents. Based on the findings that  From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27, 1978.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is negligent?

Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient?

Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?

HELD:

We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein — who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein — was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.

The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."

To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).

Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14628             September 30, 1960

FACTS:

Petitioner admitted that he is the father of Chris Hermosisima and is willing to support the latter. However, he did not gave any promise to marry the latter’s mother, Soledad Cagigas, who is his teacher and 10 years older than him. Instead, he married married one Romanita Perez.

Trial court rendered a decision for petitioner to pay Chris, by way of alimony pendente lite.

Court of Appeals confirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?

HELD:

NO.

That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.

FILAMER CHRRISTIAN COLLEGE vs IAC

GR 75112 August 17, 1992

FACTS:

Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. A fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Resulting to the death of Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic.

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code should be applied?

HELD:

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.