CALIXTO PASAGUI and FAUSTA MOSAR, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ESTER T. VILLABLANCA, ZOSIMO VILLABLANCA, EUSTAQUIA BOCAR and CATALINA BOCAR defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-21998 November 10, 1975

FACTS:

Herein petitioners filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance in Tacloban City against respondents for having took possession a parcel of land which was purchased by the former for a consideration of P2,800.

Defendants however, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction being that the action is of forcible entry. On the other hand, respondent alleges that the action was not forcible entry for the possession lacks of “whether or not, from the nature of the action pleaded as appears in the allegations of the complaint, the aforesaid action is one of forcible entry, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court”

Trial court dismissed the case, ruling that the action was of a forcible entry to which the municipal trial court  has jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, from the nature of the action pleaded as appears in the allegations of the complaint, the aforesaid action is one of forcible entry, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court

Held:

NO

In the case at bar, the complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs were in physical possession of the land and have been deprived of that possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

It is true that the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of the land subject of the sale. ² This presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee. It can be negated by the reality that the vendees actually failed to obtain material possession of the land subject of the sale.. 3 It appears from the records of the case at bar that plaintiffs-appellants had not acquired physical possession of the land since its purchase on November 12, 1962. As a matter of fact, their purpose in filing the complaint in Civil Case No. 3285 is precisely to "get the possession of the property." ⁴ In order that an action may be considered as one for forcible entry, it is not only necessary that the plaintiff should allege his prior physical possession of the property but also that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided in section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. For, if the dispossession did not take place by any of these means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have jurisdictions.. 5 The bare allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff has been "deprived" of the land of which he is and has been the legal owner for a long period has been held to be insufficient. ⁶ It is true that the mere act of a trespasser in unlawfully entering the land, planting himself on the ground and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would imply the use of force. In the case at bar, no such inference could be made as plaintiffs-appellants had not claimed that they were in actual physical possession of the property prior to the entry of the Villablancas. Moreover, it is evident that plaintiffs-appellants are not only seeking to get the possession of the property, but as an alternative cause of action, they seek the return of the price and payment of damages by the vendors "in case of eviction or loss of ownership" of the said property. It is, therefore, not the summary action of forcible entry within the context of the Rules.