Francisco Depra VS Agustin Dumlao

GR L-57348 16 May 1985

Facts:

Depra is the owner of a parcel of land to which Dumlao, living in an adjoining lot, had built a kitchen that encroached an area of 34 square meters. The encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of Depra’s property. Upon discovery, Depra’s mother wrote a demand letter asking Dumlao to move back from his encroachment. She then filed a case of Unlawful Detainer against Dumlao.

In the trial court it was proven that Dumlao was a builder in good faith; thus the Municipal Court rendered it judgment that reads:

Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs, as lessors, and the defendants as lessees, over the disputed portion with an area of thirty four (34) square meters, the rent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month, payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month the rent is due; and the lease shall commence on the day that this decision shall have become final.

Neither party appealed. However, Depra did not accept the payment of rentals so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court.

Depra then filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against Dumlao, the latter admitted the encroachment but alleged, that the present suit us barred by res judicate by virtue of the decision of the Municipal Court.

DEPRA claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on real property, may only be rendered by Courts of First Instance.

Issue:

I. Whether or not the Municipal Court’s decision was null and void ab initio because it has no jurisdiction over the case?

II. Whether or not the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRA conform to the juridical positions respectively defined by law, for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor in good faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448?

Held:

I.               Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the

Municipal Court, we hold the same to be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of possession only (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). The Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).  Since the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. Besides, even if the Decision were valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was the deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land. "

II. ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith,

shall have the right

to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or

to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.

However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof (Paragraphing supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached part of his land, 5 as he had manifested before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding because it was made in a void proceeding.

However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First Instance. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to possession," without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his encroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. 6 In this case, DUMLAO had expressed his willingness to pay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell.